# Post-quantum DNSSEC

**`pq.whisper.online` is signed with ML-DSA-44, DNSSEC algorithm 18, and nothing else. Its DS sits in `whisper.online`, and Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 validates it: AD=1. That flag is only the resolver's word, and nothing on this page rests on it: every measurement here comes from a capture.**

Two sets of captures stand behind it. The first is the enablement on 2026-11-11, one name server at a time. The second is a re-capture from a host outside our network on 2026-11-16, taken with `dig` and checked with a validator that shares no code with ours.

## What it is, and what it is not

ML-DSA-44 is the smallest parameter set of FIPS 204, the lattice signature NIST standardised for a world with quantum computers. In DNSSEC it is algorithm 18, defined by `draft-westerbaan-dnssec-mldsa-04` (IANA's entry still cites revision -03). That is an individual draft, not a working group document, and it expires on 2027-02-12. IANA lists algorithm 18 as MAY for signing and for validation.

The zone is post-quantum. The chain above it is not:

| zone | algorithm | signed by |
|---|---|---|
| `.` | 8 (RSA/SHA-256) | the root key |
| `online.` | 13 (ECDSA P-256) | its DS in the root |
| `whisper.online.` | 13 (ECDSA P-256) | its DS in `online.` |
| `pq.whisper.online.` | 18 (ML-DSA-44) | its DS in `whisper.online.`, which `whisper.online` signs with algorithm 13 |

So AD=1 from 1.1.1.1 says that the zone's ML-DSA-44 signatures verified. It does not say that the path from the root is post-quantum, because the DS that points at the ML-DSA key is itself vouched for by ECDSA.

DNSSEC authenticates answers. It does not encrypt them, so "harvest now, decrypt later" does not apply: nothing recorded today can be read later. The threat is a forged answer at the time it is served, and that needs a quantum adversary that exists on the day.

## The chain, captured

The DS record, asked of `whisper.online`'s own server over TCP:

```
pq.whisper.online.  300 IN DS     8984 18 2 3EA896857FA8CE0FFC2F6E8846EDAD12BAE6B706BCA8386BBEA3545F DB3DD26A
pq.whisper.online.  300 IN RRSIG  DS 13 3 300 20261130100000 20261116090000 50855 whisper.online. weDXxBwv...
```

The DS has algorithm 18 and digest type 2 (SHA-256). The RRSIG over it is algorithm 13, made by `whisper.online`'s key, tag 50855.

The zone's own key:

```
$ dig +multi +tcp @ns1.whisper.online pq.whisper.online DNSKEY
...  ) ; KSK; alg = 18 ; key id = 8984
```

One key, flags 257, protocol 3, algorithm 18, key tag 8984. It signs the zone and is the key the DS points at.

## Sizes

An ML-DSA-44 public key is 1,312 octets and a signature 2,420 octets. An ECDSA P-256 signature is 64. Every size below follows from that difference.

Measured on 2026-11-16 with `dig`, 176 query shapes per address, at an EDNS buffer of 1,232 octets and without DNS cookies. The tables for both name servers over IPv6, and for `ns1` over IPv4, are identical cell for cell. On the path from our vantage point to `ns2` over IPv4 a few UDP replies were lost, a different few on each run, so that table is not counted here.

| query | UDP, DO=0 | UDP, DO=1 | TCP, DO=1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| SOA | 97 | 46, TC | 2,566 |
| NS | 82 | 46, TC | 2,551 |
| DNSKEY | 46, TC | 46, TC | 3,843 |
| TXT | 181 | 46, TC | 2,650 |
| MX | 61 | 46, TC | 2,530 |
| NSEC3PARAM | 63 | 46, TC | 2,532 |
| A at the apex (no data) | 97 | 46, TC | 5,115 |
| a name that does not exist | 104 | 53, TC | 5,122 |
| ANY | 61 | 46, TC | 16,438 |
| the DS, from `whisper.online` | 94 | 204 | 204 |

Read it as two rules:

- **With DO=1, every answer from the zone is larger than 1,232 octets.** It goes out over UDP truncated, 46 to 53 octets with the TC bit set, and the resolver asks again over TCP. TCP is the carrier for this zone, not the fallback.
- **With DO=0 the answers are ordinary**, with one exception: the DNSKEY RRset alone is 1,374 octets over TCP, so it is truncated over UDP even without DO.

For scale, the same SOA question through a public resolver is 2,566 octets for `pq.whisper.online` and 204 octets for `whisper.online`.

These numbers match, octet for octet, the offline harness that ran against the same zone before it went live.

## Both servers serve the same zone

On 2026-11-11 a full copy of the zone was taken from each name server. Each held 18 records with the same SOA serial, and all 7 algorithm 18 signatures in it validated. On 2026-11-16 all four addresses (`ns1` and `ns2`, IPv4 and IPv6) answered with SOA serial 1794823715.

The answers from each server were checked with dnspython 2.9.2 on OpenSSL, through the `cryptography` package: 7 of 7 algorithm 18 RRSIGs validated on each server (SOA, NS, DNSKEY, TXT, MX, NSEC3PARAM and the NSEC3 node). As a control, the same answers checked at a time before the signatures' inception fail 7 of 7.

## Public resolvers

| resolver | `pq.whisper.online` | `whisper.online` (control, algorithm 13) |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1.1 | NOERROR, AD | NOERROR, AD |
| 8.8.8.8 | NOERROR, no AD | NOERROR, AD |
| 9.9.9.9 | NOERROR, no AD | NOERROR, AD |

The `pq.whisper.online` column was captured on 2026-11-11, after the DS had been in place longer than its 300-second TTL, and again on 2026-11-16. The control column is from 2026-11-16.

1.1.1.1 implements algorithm 18 and validates the zone. 8.8.8.8 and 9.9.9.9 do not implement it, so the DS RRset holds no algorithm they support, and RFC 4035 section 5.2 says to treat the zone as insecure. That is what they do: they answer, without AD. Neither returns SERVFAIL, which is the outcome a mistake in our signatures would produce at a resolver that does implement 18.

## Check it yourself

```
$ dig +dnssec +tcp @1.1.1.1 pq.whisper.online SOA
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
pq.whisper.online.  300  IN  RRSIG  SOA 18 3 300 20261130100000 20261116090000 8984 pq.whisper.online. SGQD...

$ dig +dnssec +tcp @8.8.8.8 pq.whisper.online SOA
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

$ dig +norec +dnssec +bufsize=1232 +ignore @ns1.whisper.online pq.whisper.online SOA
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR
;; flags: qr aa tc; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
```

`+ignore` keeps `dig` from retrying over TCP, so you see the truncated datagram a resolver sees first.

## Two algorithms in one zone

A zone can also be signed by algorithm 13 and algorithm 18 together. We have built that, and it is not live on any zone, so this page has no measurements of it. If it is used, the zone is only as strong as its weaker algorithm: RFC 6840 section 5.11 tells a validator to accept any single valid path, so an attacker who can forge the ECDSA signature presents that path.

## Next

- [DNSSEC](/docs/dnssec) - how Whisper's zones are signed with algorithm 13, and how to verify them from the root
- [DANE](/docs/dane) - what a DNSSEC-signed `TLSA` record lets an agent prove without a certificate authority
